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FOR RELEASE 
PM 
THURSDAY, June 23, 1960 
Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield (D -Montanct) 
NEW INSIGHTS -NEW POLICIES 
Something has gone wrong. That much, at least, is clear from 
the recent rapid succession of visible crises. First, there was the U -2 incident 
then the summitt-collapse and the withdrawal of the invitation to the President 
to travel to Russia and, most recently, the forced cancellation of the President1f 
visit to Japan. 
Recent events, particularly, in Japan are a source of regret and 
concern. But we shall only intensify the difficulties by a hostile and intemper-
ate reaction. Japan is going through an hour of great trial. We can best serve 
the cause of peace and our joint interests by exercising patience and restraint 
at this time. It is not for us to judge in anger and to talk of boycotts and 
retaliation unless we seek to propel the Japanese nation in the direction of the 
Soviet orbit. It is for us to try to preserve the decent and cooperative relations 
which were born after the bitterness and exhaustion of World War II. It would 
be well for us to remember that Japan is critical to freedom and peace in the 
Far East. Unless its ties with this country are maintained the positions in 
Korea and Okinawa lose much of their meaning and the security of the entire 
Far East will be endangered. 
In any event, little is to be gained at this time by angry 
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speculati("'n on what has gone wrong elsewhere either in Japan or in the Soviet 
Union~ As for what has gone wrong in our own house, that~ our business. 
It is the business of the President, the Senate, and the Congress. It is the 
business of the people of the United States. 
!~~ to~nd~r:s;~n~ w~;; ~aos:st~~~~. ;v~or;gJ-:"%~, h=av.,:_g2!__,!_~go 
back to the ~t where the difficulty first became apparent. That P"int, 
Mr. President, is the U-2 incident. We have got to face the facts of that 
incident, honestly and bluntly. We have got to face them before they fade 
into the obscurity of time. 
I have in ' ePt ionally reserve d this comment until the President 
had returned from the Orient and the CQmmittee on Foreign Relations had 
completed its inquiry into the U-2 affair. But it is appropriate, now, to 
try to put the incident into perspective. Enough facts for that purpose are 
now public information. 
It is possible to draw reasonable C 1'~nclusions C'n the U-2 affair 
in terms of our national security and welfare, but it is not easy or painless 
to do so. The incident occurred in connection with Soviet Ras sla and is, 
therefore, heavily charged with emotion~ A natural tendency exists to describe 
the affair in the best possible light, to see its consequences in the most 
optimistic fashio!l, Moreover, delicate queAt~ons of national unity and 
naticnal security are interwoven with the affair. We are compelled to measure 
what we say against possible H.lsintcJ.-pr~tatioJl. And, finally, Mr .. President, 
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the facts of the incident which occurred in May have more and more become 
eonfused with the fancies of November. 
So, I repeat, Mr. President, it is neither easy nor painless to 
draw reasnnable conclusions on this incident. Nevertheless, we ml!st make 
the effort~ As responsible officials, we owe that much t 3 the people whom we 
represent. We owe it to the people whose lives and fortunes were cast into 
the incident. We must make the effort in order to gaJn new national insights. 
We must make the effort in order to recast both ottr policies and thei:::- adminw 
istration for the greater sec'..lrity and welfare l'lf tl:e nation. 
I speak for myself and only for myself, as one Member of the 
Senate of the United States, in making these remarks. I should like to 
emphasi z e that the remarks are based solely on the public record, as it is 
to be found in various 0fficial statements, in the reports <'f the press, radio 
and TV and in the published hearings of the Committee rm FC1lrei gn Relations. 
There is more than er.::mgh information in this public record 
to reach reasonable conclusions, The American press and other communica-
tions facilities have performed an exceptional public service in connect~.on 
with the coverage of the U-2 incident, In these past few weeks, we have 
seen and hea:rQAmerican journalism in breadth, in depth, and at its best. 
I should also like to commend the able Senator frcm Arkansas 
(Mr. Fulbr:lght) for his contributions to our understanding 0£ the U -2 affa:!.r. 
was 
His chairmanship of the inquiry into the incident, exemplary in every 
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way. Without jeopardizing security or unity, he saw to it in accord with the 
Administration, that adequate and dispassionate information on these proceed-
ings was made public. 
Irrelevant Questions 
Mr. President, it has seemed to me that our principal responsi-
bility, as Senators, has been to try to understand the facts of the U- 2 incident 
in the hope that out of the experience might come new and better ideas as to 
how to proceed more effectively in the future. I assume that atl Senators, all 
officials, who are discus sing this matter in public forums have had similar 
purposes in mind. 
For that reason, Mr. President, I should like to deal first with 
what I believe are three extraneous questions which have been insinuated into 
the debate and discussion, If we permit ourselves to be side-tracked into 
matters such as these, we shall gain little of use to the nation from the 
experience despite the great price that has been paid for it. 
Irrelevant Cuestions: Why the Summit collapsed? 
The first is the question of why the 5ummit collapsed. Since 
responsible officials of this government have stated for the record that they 
expected little from the meeting long before it was torpedoed, then I can see 
little relevance in the question of who fired the tube. Indeed, if we are to go 
into su::h conjectural matters, we might find it far more profitable to ask why 
we agreed to go to the meeting in the first place. Why, indeed, should 
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we have participated, if, U -2 or net, the Summit was gning to be of so 
little value 7 
For my part, I am prepared tC' accept what is apparently the 
thesis of this Administration that Mr, Khrushchev~ dealt the cot~p de grace 
to what was destined to be, in any event, a somewhat fruitless meeting. 
One might, I suppose, on tr.e basis of this thesis, commend Mr, Kt.rushchev 
for saving the American taxpayers a good deal of money. For conferences 
ef this kind are most costly, involving as they do, the travel expenses and 
pay of a large delegation ('.f officials; and the costs pile up, the hmger they 
remain, uselessly, in session. 
Irrelevant Question: Shculd we have apologized? 
The seccnd quest:.on which I regard as irrelevant to the discussion 
is whether we should have apologized to the Soviet Union in Paris, It is true 
that nations from time to time infrir..ge the rights of ether r..ations. Svmetimes 
they apC'logize for these infringements and even pay damages. Sametimes 
they denr the infringements or, at any rate, do n'"t apol('.gize for them. As 
a nation, we are not an exception. We have done b0th. On occasicm, we have 
ignored the complaints of others and on occasion we have apa>l0gized. 
Oddly enough, durin~ this Administration, long before the 
question was posed after the events in Paris, I believe we h3.d already 
apolngized to the s._,viet Uni("n for an infringement. Oddly enough, it was 
an infringement which grew out of the flight of an American plane. I read 
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to the Senate, infull, adispatchintheNewYorkTimes, Februrary2, 
1958, page 25: 
"U. S, Apologizes on Jet F'light" 
"BERLIN, Feb. 1 (AP) --The United States ha.s 
apologized to the Soviet Union because a United States 
Air Force jet made an accidental flight over East 
German territory Thursday. A United ~tates 
mission spokesman said the apology had been made 
in an o1·al exchange between the Soviet and United 
States members of the Air Safety Center, the Big 
Four body that controls air traffic to Berlin. 11 
So, Mr. President, when the question is asked should we have 
apologized or expressed regrets let no one associated with this Administ:r.ation 
throw up his hands in horror at the mere thought. This Administration, 
apparently, has already a-eologized to the Soviet Union and to other nations 
for infringements of one kind or another and notably for plane flights. 
It so happens, Mr. President, that I agree with the attitude 
which Mr. Eisenhower took in not apologizing to Mr. Khrushchev. I agree 
with it, in the light of the circumstances which prevailed at that time. I 
agreE' with it on the basis of the manner and place in which the demand was 
made. I agree with it on the basis of the publicly-known facts. If the 
intrusion of the U- 2 had been an accident- -if it had been an oversight 
rather than an overflight--then, indeed, an apology or an expression of 
regret immediately after the incident had occurred might have been in order. 
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But these circumstances did not prevail. The explanations 
given out after the incident emphasized that neither an accident nor an 
oversight was involved. Further, the explanations indicated that we were 
pursuing some fixed policy in these fLights, based upon national and free-
world necessity. Finally, the world-wide impression was created and 
allowed to stand until the Paris meeting, that these flights would be continued. 
To have apologized in these circumstances would have bad no meaning. It1 
could have served only to subject us to the world-wide ridicule, Therefore, 
I agree~ on the basis of the known facts, with the President's decision not 
to apologize. 
It is possible, of course, that all the facts have not been 
made public. It is conceivable that on the basis of all the facts, another 
course might have been indicated. After all the Administration had a 
precedent, as noted in the New York Times dispatch that I have just quoted. 
It may be that there is still a feeling of doubt in the minds of some that we 
did take the right course. It may be this doubt which prompts some to 
continue to raise this question, this question of whether or not we should 
have apologized in Paris. If that is the case, then, I suggest those who 
are still perJ?lexed should address the question to the Administration. 
But if the question is addressed to the American people or to the candidates 
for the Presidency, it has no relevance to an understanding of the U -2 
incident. By obscuring the facts of the incident,. it will inhibit the nation 
from understanding the incident and profiting from it, 
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Extraneous Question: Do we want another Pearl Harbor? 
The third extraneous question, Mr. President, is v.he ther 
or not we want a nether Pearl Harbor. This question has something in common 
with one which is asked in a !amous play. Most Senators will remember the 
question from their childhood. The question is asked by Peter Pan, as Tinker 
Be.ll, the devoted but errant pixie lies desperately ill, its light flickering 
dimly. Peter Pan addresses the audience and asks whether or not they 
wish Tinker Belt to die. The response cff the audience, through generations 
of children, has invariably been a resounding "no". 
In the san•e fashion, Mr. President, I cannot conceive of 
any American in his right senses answering anything other than "no" to the 
question of whether or not we want another Pearl Harbor. But since this 
question has been raised, I am sure, not with any desire to appeal to an 
audience, but out of a deep concern for the 
take the time of the Senate to analyze it. 
security of the nation, I shall 
lf the question is going to have more relevance to our 
underotanding of the U -2 incident then Peter Pan 1s, it is necessary to 
determine what is inferred by it. After all, it is two decades since Pearl 
Harbor. · .... 
IJ·a-s·s-ume·, thereltJ!•e~ i~Jhal.t ~the 
inference of the question is that the U -2 flight-program was vital in 
preventing a catastrophic military attack on the security of this nation. 
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Secretary of Defense Gates, indeed, seems to have used the worU "vital" to 
describe the kind of information which the flights were producing. 
Importance of the U -2 Program and the Ill-fated U -2 Flight 
I am most anxious, Mr. President, that President Eisenhower 
decide and do what is "vital" for the security of this natio;1. I have tried in 
the past, at all times, to give him my full support in such decisions and 
actions. It is his primary responsibility. National unity requires that he 
be supported in exercising this responsibility in vital matters. 
All we may reasonably ask is tha t the President in fact does 
decide and that he does watch closely every aspect of these vital decisions. 
If the U -2 flights were "vital11 to prevent another Pearl Harbor then they 
should have bee n made. But, equally, they should have been made under the 
continuous scrutiny of the President and the coordh1ated scrutiny of Members 
of his Cabinet. 
The facts in the public record show clearly, however, that 
while politically-responsbile officials knew genera.lly of this program of 
U -2ovefflightA they did not subject them to continuous and coordinated 
scrutiny, The facts indicate that the control and timing of them was in the 
hands of various obscure employees of the bureaucracy. It is quite clear 
that Mr. Eisenhower did not push any button to set the particular ill-fat.ed 
U-2 flight in motion, nor did Mr. Gates, nor Mr. Herter. 
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Since that is the case, Mr. President, we must question either the 
degree of attention which these officials were paying to their duties in vital 
matters or we must conclude that it is misleading to create the impression 
that these flights, in themselves, were vital. The word, vital, as the Senate 
knows, means essential to life. I have the highest respect for the President 
and the Members of his Cabinet. I am sure none was negligent in his responsi-
bilities. I can only assume, therefore, that while the flights were important, 
they were not regarded as really so important as to command the continuing 
attention of the politically-responsible officials of the Administration. I can 
only conclude that the word "vital" is too strong to use in describing their 
importance. 
That such may be the case is indicated by the suspension of the flights 
by the President and his assurance to Mr. Khrushchev that they would not be 
resumed. Obviously, if they were vital to prevent another Pearl Harbor 
attack upon our security the President would never have made that decision. 
The fact is, Mr. President, that the security of this nation, any 
nation, in this uncertain and dangerous world is safeguarded not by any single 
factor but by many fact('rs. These factors of security fall into two general 
categories: (1) foreign policies, which should act to reduce the dangers and 
uncertainties which confront us abroa<;; and (2) the total capacity of the nation 
for defense. These categories include far more than intelligence -operations 
and far- -far more than any single intelligence operation such as the U -2 
program. Our security depends on the morale and determination ~f the people 
of the nation. It depends on the attitudes of peoples in the Communist nations 
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as, for example, whether or not they are militant in their hostility to us 
or whether, persuaded that we intend them no harm, the militancy is tempered 
It includes the state of trust and confidence which exists between ourselve.s 
and friendly peoples. Particularly, it includes the attitudes of those nations 
which stand firm and independent in their I")Wn right, but nevertheless are 
allied with us against common dangers. It includes the efficiency of our 
Defense Establishment, its weapr.ms and it9 state of readiness. lt includes 
~ur scientific creativity and our technical ingenuity. It includes--
this base upon which our security stands--all these elements and many others. 
It is in terms of all these elements that any reasonable evalua~ 
of the U -2 program and the ill-fated flight in particular must be made, not 
in terms of the spectre of a Pearl Harbor attack two decades a.go. Even as 
an intelligence-operation, without regard for the other factors on which our 
security depends, we muot weigh the risks and cost of the U-2 flights against 
the availability from other sources of the kind of informat;on which they pro-
duced. In this connecti~n, I would point out that much has been made of the 
fact that the U -2 flights obtained data on the location of Russian missile 
sites, submarine bases and nuclear center~;. That is clearly information 
of a most significant nature for the defense of the nation. But to illustrate 
that there are sources of information other than U -2 reconnaisance flights, 
even on such significant matters, even in countries which made a fetish of 
secrecy, I call to the attention of the Senate an article from the magazine 
"Missiles and Rockets." In an issue, published early this year, it lists and 
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pin-points on a rna? ten Soviet I. C . B. M. sites_ nnd 30 I. R. B. M. aites which 
were hc~ted from pubJic sources in :S~rope and from techni ';al jonrnals. 
I ask unanimous cunsent that this article appea:::- at the conclusion of my re -
marks. 
I also cc.ll to the attenticn of the Senate an article by Sarrison 
Salir>bury in the Ncvr Y01k Times, Sept.:.mber 30, 1954. and an article in 
the ''Bullet~n of th~ Atomi;:: Scientists" (October l9S9) 'cy ArncJ.d Kranish. 
These articles reveal c. eat deal about certain Soviet ;uum:.c centers and 
contain information on them w~ich no aerial phc~ograph could possibly supply. 
I ask unanimous cor.ser.t that both articles be printed at the co!l.clusion of my 
remarks. I also re~er the Senate to the fuller treatment of this subject as it 
appec:.r3 in a book by Mr. Kranish entitled "Atomic Energy in the Sl"lviet 
Union" (Stanford Univernity Press, 1959). 
I call to the attention o£ '.:he Senate the ref~rence work, "Jane's 
Fighti!'g Ships (1950-1960)," wh!.c':l lists, with photogra:nr.s, submarines of 
the Soviet N<~·ry. Finallv, I refer the S~nate to the boolc "The Soviet Navy" 
edit eel by Commander M. G. Saunc1er s of the United Kingdom (Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1958) . On pages 161-163 there is a detailed table of the location 
and capacity of shipyards throughout the Soviet Union, specializing in naval 
work . I ask unanimous consent that the table referred to be included in the 
record at the conclusion of my remarks and I strcngly recommend to those 
whose work may require a more detailed picture of the Soviet navy this book 
edited by Commander Saunders. 
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I do not \Vish to leave the imEE_ession, Mr. President, that I believe 
these and eimilar oublications are the equivalent in militrtry value of the 
aerial films of Rusoia produced by the U -2 program. So far as I know, in 
sorne respects, they may be more complete, more valuable and in others less 
complete, less valuable. All I am trying to suggest., Mr. President, is that 
while obviously we cannot ignore the importance cf secret intelligence-
operations, we muet recognize equally that they are not always the cnly 
source ~ and .they are not nece s5arily 
always the best source of information. They are a part of or should be a part 
o£ a total pattern of defense which takes in~o consideration all aspects cf 
foreign and defe:n.se policy. 
I cannot bring myGeH to believe that anyon~ who raises the question, 
do we wa::1t another Pearl Harbor, seriously wishe o to leave with this Senate 
or the people ci tl:.e United States the impression that the C. I. A. and, in 
particular, one aeria.l-recoimaisance operation of the agency, alone, stands 
between us and 8 . :repetition of that catastrophe. 
Cost of the U -2 Fli~ 
On the basis of the public record we can assume that these flights 
produced information--probably very impo!'tant information--for certain 
aspects of our military defense. On the basis of tke public record, we know 
that they produced this information at an enormous price. And it is only in 
an information to cost ratio that they can be properly evaluated. I am talking, 
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now, not of the monetary cost of the flights, which were undoubtedly high, but 
of the full cost, in terms of damage to the total pattern of the foreign and de-
fense policies by which we seek to safeguard our security. It is difficult to 
estimate that coat, Mr. President, if for no other reason than that all the 
bills have probably not yet beea submitted. On May 9th, as the facts of the 
U -2 incident began to clarify, I stated in the Senate: 
"The President has been undercut on the eve of a major 
international conference at a moment of world crisis. 
The world-wide adverce repercussio;:'ls for the foreign 
policy of :he United States have only begun but they will 
be heard loudly and ominously from Norway to Japan." 
If we cannot measure the cost of this flight in any specific fashion, 
we can, nevertheless, gain some indication of it by observing the events 
which have transpired in the nation and in the world since May 1, less than 
two months ago. Let me stress that there are many factors which explain 
each of the developments which I am about to list. Nevertheless, I know'"Of 
no serious evaluation of the pre sent international situation which would ingore 
the U -2 incident as one of the factors in each of them. 
(1) The colJ apse of the Summit whose value only the Administration 
can estimate since it was responsible for pl4rsuing it. 
(2) The intensification of anti-American sentiment, the cancellation 
of the President's visit, and the cprouting of seeds of deep opposition in Japan 
to the Japanese-United States security treaty. 
(3) The shock at home arrl in many friendly nations at the confirma-
tion of the fact that we were engaged in activities which, theretofore, many 
tended to associate almost wholly with Snviet behavior. 
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(4) The embarrassment of certain nations allied with us, around the 
periphery of the Soviet Union and, in consequence, the inetitutio_n by them 
of more stringent control over the use of their def.ense facilities by the United 
States~ 
(5) The intensification of the threat of war by accident or miscalcula: 
tion growing out of the order to Soviet military authorities to rocket the bases 
in surrounding nations from which unauthorized planes might intrude and the 
restatement of our determination to fulfill our defense cor~'lmitments to these 
nat.ions. 
(6) The strengthening of the hand r:Jf hard-line communists within the 
Soviet Union and the communist bloc, notably the Chinese communists, against 
those in Communi£t countries who might believe it possible to live at least 
without ~nilitary conflict, if not i.n harmony with us, on this globe grown so 
small. 
(7) The partial resumption of the tactics of the cold war, thereby 
renderir.g more difficult all efforts to deal with international problems by 
rational negotiation. 
(8) The intensification of pressure on the Congress for increas~d 
foreign aid appropriations, notably military aid, and increased defense spend-
ing in the light of the increased tensions flowing fro:::n the U -Z incident. 
Origins of the Ill-fated U -2 Flight 
It is all very well for Mr. Eisenhower to assume personal responsi-
bility for this coatly program of overflights which contributed in greater or 
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lesser degree to all of these devel0pments. In an ultimate sense, he is 
responsible for everything tha.t transpires in our relations with other nations. 
It would not be in keeping wit!-1 his character to shi:::-k that responsibility. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the public record, as I have already noted, 
that not a single Member of the Cabinet nor the President exercised any 
direct control wh~tsoever over the ill-fated U-2 flight at the critical moment 
at which it was launched. It ought to be made clear that this particular flight 
was apparently set in motion on the basis of a law passed in 1947, an execu-
tive order issued about 7 years ago and by what, apparently, was a routine 
clearance some weeks before the flight itEelf. If we can draw any conclusion 
from the public record itis that this particular flight owes its origin more to 
bureaucratic inertia, lack of coordination and control and insensitivity to its 
potential cost than it does to any conscious decision of politically-responsible 
leadership. 
Lack of Fixed Responsibility and Coordination 
That conclusion is reinforced by the confusion which surrounded the 
release of official explanations of the flight. At least three Departments or 
agencies --Defense, State and N.A. S. A., without adequate and continuing con-
sultation- -one with the other- -contributed Eltatements by way of explanation. 
Add to that the comments emanating from the White House. Add to that, the 
C. I. A. --prompting from behind the scenes. Add to that, the words of the Vice 
President who, stepping into the matter at the 11th hour, tried to rescue the si-
tuation with speeches in New York. 
Mr. President, we do not have to wait for Mr. Khrushchev to ask the 
question. We need to ask it ) ourselves: Who runs this Administration in the 
vital matters of foreign policy and defense? 
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It is not a new gu~stion. The shocking disarray of departments, 
agencies and sub-agencies through which this nation tries to conduct the foreign 
relations and defense of the nation, at best, borders on a national disgrace and, 
at worst, courts national disaster. 
In a speech in the Senate during the closing days of the last 
session (September 4, 1959), the problem was alluded to in these terms and, 
I shall quote at length from my remarks at that time because they apply most 
directly to the U -2 incident: 
" •••• ,We-- not others-- deterrnine for what purpose 
we have a ~tate Department, an aid-administration, a 
E:entral Intelligence Agency, an Information Eervice and 
a host of other agencies which carry on activiti.es abroad 
on the basis of appropriations from public funds and on 
behalf of the entire n a tion. We alone decide how they shall 
function. 
"When I use the term 'we, 1 I mean, of course, the 
people of the United Ctates, In mattGrs of foreign 
relations, however, the responsibility for interpreting 
what we want and how we are to pursue it rests, in a 
theoretical sense, with the elected President, acting 
in some instances with the advice and consent of the 
elected Senate and in others with the concurrence of 
the elected Congress, 
"That is the Constitutional theory, Mr. President, 
but what is the fact? The fact is that the power to 
interpret the will of the nation in respect to our vast 
and complicated relations with the rest of the world has 
been diffused through - the enormous labyrinth 
of the Executive Branch of the government. The power to 
decide, in short, has been scattered and diluted to the point 
where it has become virtually impossible to use the public 
power effectively to bring about adjustments in policy and 
its administration at somewhere near the time that these 
adjustments are needed. 
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"In these circumstances, natio·nal interests frequently 
become so interwoven with bureaucratic interests 
and conflicts that we are less and less abte to adjust 
the total needs of the nation to the changing circumstances 
of the world, More and rr..ore we have a policy determined 
by Executivt! agency accommodation a-nd less and less by the 
leadership and decision of the responsible political officials 
of the Administration and the Congress. 
"I realize that this problem has been with the 
nation for a long time, It is not amenable to easy solutione 
Nevertheless, Mr. President, we must deal with it, if 
responsible government in the field of foreign policy is 
not to degenerate into a cat ch-phrase, We must stay with 
this problem- -the President and the Congre3s- -until it 
yields to rational solution." 
And, I repeat now, almost a year later that, indeed, we must stay 
with this problem until it yields to rational solution, That, in my opinion, 
is the most significant conclusion which can be drawn from the U -2 incident. 
In short, the most pres sing need of this government i s a more effective, a 
more responsible and responsive system of administration of its foreign 
relations and its defense. And, at the same time, in the wake of the collapse 
of the summit we ne e d to get straiaht, once and for all, that personal 
magneti.sum and the personal contacts of heads of states are not a substitute 
for policie s continually attuned to the e ver-changing realities of the world. 
I reach this conclusio:1 notwithstanding the President's, and Vice President's 
continued endorsement of summit conferences and personal diplomacy as 
reported in the N e w York Times (June 18, 1960) by Harrison Salisbury and 
the Washington 8 tar (June 19, 1960) by David ':; , Broder. I ask unanimous 
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consent that these reports from the Times, and the Star be printed at the 
conclusion of my remarks. 
The basic questions remain: Can we develop a more responsive, more 
reponsible administrative system? Can we devise the new policies which 
are essential and keep them adjusted to ever -changing realities? 
I am firmly convinced that, to, do so, is in the "vital" interest of the 
freedom of this nation. May I say that I use the word "vital" here advisedly, 
with full awareness of its literal meaning. In this connection, I wish to note 
the outstanding contribution that is already being made by the special committee 
under the Chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. 
Jackson) on the question of administration. 
As the Senate knows, over the years, I have made suggestions- -as one 
Senator, along with other members of this body- -both with regard to policy 
made have 
and its administration. Sometimes suggestions which I have I entered into 
policy, in whole or part, and often they have not. In any event, I have tried 
to be constructive in the past, That is my intention, today, in setting forth 
additional and specific proposals on our policies and their administration, 
The needed changes cannot be brought about by glittering generalities, 
All of us desire a durable peace, All of us wish to saf~guard the nation, All 
of us seek more efficient, effective and responsible administration of the 
nation's foreign and defense affairs. The problem is not to state and restate 
these generalities. The problem now, is to set forth specifics which may act 
to bring us closer to these desired ends, 
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I am persuaded that the problem is primarily one of new ideas and of 
action on ideas. We need ideas on how to improve our policies and their admin-
istration. We need ideas set forth now; ideas to be amended; ideas to be 
adopted or rejected; but as of this moment, above all, ideas to be discussed. 
I believe the thoughts which I am about to express contain some promise 
of a more effective, efficient and responsible administration of our international 
affairs and our defense. I believe they may help to lead us to a more rational 
and secure position in the world than the position of quicksand on which we now 
stand, The Senate may find that they do not hold any such '(llll"Omise. Neverthe-
less, we must begin in earnest on this problem in its specifics and I shall 
present these thoughts, as a beginning, for wha tever they may be worth. 
Possible Administrative Changes 
The first set of sug gestions which I lay before the Sena te, Mr. 
President, deal with administrat ive changes in the c onduct of foreign relations 
and aspe cts of defen se. The y a re prompted by e1e U -2 incident and its 
handline but they repre sent many years of study, experience apd observation 
of the ope ration of this gove rnment. I present the s ugge stions, at this time, 
in outline form, su fficient only to indicate the channels in which improvement 
might be sought. 
(1) Considera tion should be given to the di s solution of the National 
Security Council sta ff structure and the transfer of the functions of that body 
to the regular cabinet departments of the Executive Branch. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 40, Folder 89, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
-21-
(2) The importance of the Cabinet as the principaL source of advice to 
the President should be re.ass erted, Within the Cabinet, an Inner Council con-
sisting of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense under the Chairman-
ship of the President should meet on a continuing basis on all matters of 
critical importance to the peace and security of the nation. 
(3) The function of the Vice-President should be confined to that 
defined in the Constitution which is to preside over the Senate and to such 
ceremonial functions as the President, with the concurrence of the Senate 
leadership, may aseign from time to time to the office. 
(4) The independent status of all agencies with predominantly inter-
national functions- -in particular, the linternational Cooperation Administration 
and the United States Information Service should be terminated promptly. 
The functions of these agencies and personnel should be fully incorporated 
into the Department of State, with due recognition of the contribution which 
the employees of these agencies have made and with due regard to their 
right to fair treatment. Any large-scale reductions in personnel which 
these mergers may entail should be brought about, primarily, through normal 
attrition and special adjustments in the retirement system, with personnel in 
the Department of 3tate and in the agencies, considered on the basis of equality..!. 
(5) Full control over all international policies and activities of agencies 
with predominantly domestic functions, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense and the Department 
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of Commerce should be lodged with the Department of =: tate. 
(6) A drastic reduction in the major decision-making and, hence, 
decision-delaying personnel should be made in the hierarchy of the Department 
of Defense and in the three services and in the Department of State, 
(7} Justification before the Congress of the military budget and the 
division of appropriations as among the services should be the exclusive 
responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the civilian Secretaries of each 
service. As a general practice, our highest military officers should be 
permitted to concentrate on the problems of military defense and should not 
be involved in the politics of budgeting or the process of appropriations. 
(8) The functions of the C. I. A. in the gathering of nonclandestine 
intelligence information sbould be integrated into already existing intelligence 
branches of tl:e Department of Defense and the Department of State in order 
to limit what, at present, appears to be a great duplication of effort. Further, 
intelligence-gathering operations by the Department of Defense, should be 
confined to military matters and, by the Department of State to non-military 
matters. Finally, a select committee of the two Departments should be 
established to evaluate and advise the President and the Inner Cabinet Council 
on all intelligence matters. C. I. A. personnel who may be affected by this 
equality 
change should be treated on the same basis of fairness and as already 
noted in connection with the proposed integration of the U.S. I. s. and the I. C. A. 
into the Department of State. 
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(9) 1. Spe cial Joint Committee of Congress on the C. I . A. should be 
established on the pattern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and should 
be kept as fully apprised as possible in relation to the national int~rest, of any 
rerraining functions of the C. I. A. 
(10} The c· ecretary of State should be assigned responsibility by the 
President for estab!ishing and enforcing policies on public speeches and public 
pronouncements of ~ll officials- -military and civilian- -of the Executive Branch 
which deal with ques tions involving our relations with other nations. Atrl, in 
gene ral, all Executi ve Branch personnel outside of the Department of State 
should a void public remarks in tJli.ese matters. 
(H) The entire Committee-structure within the Department of Defense 
and the Department of State and among the Departments and Agencies of the 
Executive Branch, involved in foreign and defense affairs, should be reviewed 
from top to bottom, by a Presidential-Congressional Commission with a view 
to a drastic reduction in their numbers. 
Proposals in Policy 
Let me outline next, Mr. President, certain suggestions relative to 
the content of foreign policies. These changes are required now more than 
ever, for the bubble r:>f peace by public relations has burst and we need, • .. . •: 
promptly, to fill the void with new policies for peace. I shall confine my 
comments, today, to those aspects of policy which I believe to be most 
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critical, the most urgent. If I do not make mention of the foreign aid program 
in these suggestions, it is because my views on this matter are well-known. 
They are to be found in detail in a report issued this year by a Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on the Aid-Program in Viet Nam, many of the 
conclusions of which have a far wider applicability than to that one nation. My 
views are also expressed in speeches to the £enate last year and in amendments 
offered at that time to the aid-bill. 
l. Overflights 
The A merican A mba ssador in Moscow shonld be instructed to invite 
consultations with his c olleagues from those nations on the periphery of the 
Soviet Union and with officials of the Sovie t foreign offic e with a view to clarify-
ing the implications of the order to the Sovi et military forces to rocket the 
bases from which planes may intrude into the Soviet Union. The need is to 
eliminate, at on c e, the possibility of a sudden ignition of massive nuclear 
conflict, by accident or inadvertence. This possibility is dangerously inherent 
in the Soviet military order and our response to it. By the same token we 
should clarify our own position on plane s which may intrude, by accident or 
inadvertence, into the air-space of the Unite d States. 
This question is the most pressing matter facing the nations of the 
world today. Some international a g reement on a n accepted procedure for 
dealing with accidental ove rflights is essential and it is urgent. Until the 
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fingers are removed from the hair-triggers, we are not justified in assuming 
that a single human being in this country, in Russia or anywhere in the world 
has a minimum degree of ... ·ational security against sudden, inadvertent 
destruction. This problem, of border intrusions, is part and parcel of the 
whole question of surprise attack, If we can conceive of any greater or more 
futile disaster to mankind than a deliberate attack which ignited a nuclear war 
it would be an accidental and unn~cessary~tack which ignited a nuclear war, 
2, Disarmament and Nuclear Testing 
It should be recognized by all co-.H:erned that there are not now and 
there are not likely to be any absolute, 100% guarantees of fullproof inspection 
of anything. Similarly, it should be recognized that total disarmament down 
to the level of sticks and stones in the circumstances in which the world finds 
itsel.f is a fantasy. Therefore, the conferences on disarmament and nuclear 
testing should either be abandoned or the positions of all nations concerned 
in these matters should be revised, so that they are no longer wedded to 
absolutes that cannot, rationally, be met. If there is to be any approach which 
offers hope of progress in this field,. it must be one of weighing the risks of 
rational inspection coupled with the beginnings of international disarmament, 
on one hand, against the consequences of an uninterrupted, an intensifying and 
a spreading armament competition on the other and this approach must be 
accepted by all the participants, 
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3, Berlin 
Our policy s~1ot::.ld go beyond a mere holding cf Wect Berlin and, 
apparently, a willi_ngness to make concessions by limiting weapons and men 
in that half -city. Our p -:.,licy Ghould embrace and advocate the neutr:tlizatio~ 
and internationalizat ion of all of Berlin--both Soviet and Western zones--
on an interim oasis, until it is once again the capital of a unified Germany. 
To that end we should seek, through diplomatic negotiations, United Nations 
control and polici ng of the er.tire city and routes of access, with the cost of 
the undertaking borne by the governments of bot h J:-arts of Germany in 
appropriate shares . 
4, Far East 
Congress "''nu.ld, in the next ses si.on, consider a substitute or a re-
vision of the Formosa resolntion of 1955 which w ould: (a) Alter the status 
of this resolution from an Act cf Law into a resolution of Congressional 
advice to t~e President, v1ithou~ forc e of law; and (b) make clear that, as 
far as Congressiona l advice in this m a.t t er is c oncerned, it applies only to_ 
the defe nse of Formosa and the Pesceldore s by Americiin miJ.itc..ry forces. 
One condition should be attached to this clarification. It is that the Chinese 
Communists shaH not seek to hamper the peaceful adjustment of the mili-
tary pos itions of the Chinese Na.tion a.l go vernment outside Formosa and the 
Pescadores, positions which it may have been led to take on the assumption 
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that th~ American commitment extended beyond these islands. I should like 
to note that this is not a new view but one which I have he!d since this resolu-
tion was first considered. I had doubts then about its constitut ional implica-
tions and vagueness. I still ente!"tain the same doubts. I should like, also, 
to call to the attention of the Senate the views of the President en this matter 
a8 he expresssed them in Formosa and tc that end ask un.animous consent to 
include at the conclusion of my remarks an article by Harrison Salisbury 
in the New Yo•k Ti.rnes, June 19, 1960. 
5. We should begin no\·.r, in diplomatic exploration, to seek to channel cur 
efforts in space exploration into a joint program with the other N. A. T. 0. 
members. Our objective should be to marshall the full scientific and 
technical talents d the West and to spread the enormous costs of this 
enterprise. Ultimately, the world should act as a unit in the universe 
but the time to begin to mcve towards that goal is now and the logical 
place for us to begin is in concert with the NATO nations. 
6. China and Soviet Russian-Chinese Relations 
Windows of contact and legitimate first -hand observations should 
be ope n e d on devel opments in China 2-r.d alon& one of the most critical 
borders in the world, the Soviet and Chinese convergence in Outer Mo:1golia 
in Central Asia. To that end, the possibilities of an exchange of missions 
with the government Qf Outer Mongolia should be seriously explored, A 
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renewal of efforts for the exchange of newsmen with China on a quid pro quo 
basis should be undertaken. A revision of trade restrictions with the Chinese 
mainland to bring them into line with those which apply to the Soviet Union 
should be considered. May I say, parenthetically, that these suggestions 
do not imply recognition by this country of Communist China. To the best 
of my knowledge we have never offered it nor have they sought it and there 
is nothing to indicate its desirability or even its possibility at this time. 
7. Middle East 
The Congres G should cone:ider a revision or substitute for the 
Eisenhower resolution on the Midd.le Eact which would: (a) Alter the 
present legal Btatl.!e of the resolution as an act of law to that of a resolution 
of Congressional advice to the President; and (b) make clea-.:' that, within the 
over-all purpose of seeking to help nations in that region defend themselves 
against communism, our policieG are now based squarely on the foHowing 
premises: 
(1) Stabilizatior:. of existing frontiers, except as they may be altered 
by peaceful agreement; 
(2) Dissolutil'n of the refugee problem by the joint principle of re-
patriation, as practicable, and just compensation; 
(3) Full freedom of passage o£ Suez now and a gradual reduction of the 
other practices of economic warfare in the area; 
(4) Full support of the use of U.N. emergency forces for the safeguard 
of the borders of any nation which fears for its security, with all U.N. membe : 
bearing reaso~able portions of the cost of such operations; 
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(5) Internationalization of the Holy Places in Jerusaleum; 
{6) Efforts to control and reduce the flow of armaments to all 
nations of the Middle East, coupled with international guarantees of support 
to any nation which may be victimized by an act of aggression. 
These principles are close to those which are contained or irr.plied in 
our present policies, They favor neither Arab nor Israeli. They favor those 
who mean it when they talk of peace and are prepared to begin now to work 
for it. The important need is to spell out these principles, by a vigorous 
adherence to them not only in official public statements, but in diplomacy, in 
aid-activities and in all other aspects of the conduct of our politices in the 
Middle East. 
8. Cuba 
Governor Munoz -Marin, an outstanding citizen of this nation as well 
as Puerto Rico, one o£ the most respected leaders of the Western Hemisphere, 
should be requested to undertake a mission to Havana. If he is able to assume 
this responsibility, he should engage in frank discussions with Premier Castro 
and submit in private or public, as he deems desirable, his analysis of the 
present deplorable state of Cuban-American relations and his recommendations 
as to what may be done to improve them, 
9. Personal Diplomacy a.nd Summits 
A moratorium should be declared on official visiting and conferences 
of Heads of the States, (particularly as this practice may involve nations with 
which we have major problems at issue. This moratorium should last at 
least until it is clear that specific problems have been pre -negotiated to the 
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brink of ag!"eement, Further, we need to conserve the strength and time of 
the Secretary of State and, to that end, a greater use of ambassadors, 
adequately instructed is clearly indicated. 
Concluding Comments 
As I have already noted, Mr. President, the thoughts which I have 
expressed today touch, not upon all, but only upon the most in1mediate and 
the most pressing questions which col"'..front us in our foreign relations. 
Nevertheless, I have set f orth these· thoughts, not without trepidat:.on, not 
without a sense of my own inadequacies but, withal, with a recognition of 
my great responsibilities as a Senator of the United States. 
For the matters with which I have dealt in these remarks are those 
in which no man can aspire to certain knowledge. They are matters of 
paramount importance to jpeople of the United States. They are matt era 
which, when taken together, not only relate to the kind of life we shall have 
in this decade but m atters which may well be critical in determining 
whether there shall be a recognizable civilized life, at all, for ourselves 
and for much of the human race. 
Against this monumental background, questions of how soft or how 
tough we are intalking to the Russians or to any other people have little 
relevance to our survival or welfare. H ow wise we are and how dedicated 
we may be to the interest s d the nation and to fr e edom, b eyond all personal 
concern, are central to the problem which confronts us. 
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A looming shadow is on the nation and en the world; a shadow cast 
by serious questions, too long deferred; a shadow cast by serious thought 
too long evaded. It is for this President and the next, Democrat or Republi-
can, and fCl" the Congress t o r e cognize this shadow, to define its dimensions 
and to act to lift it. It must be lifted. It can be lifted. Let us, now, all 
cl us, begin in earnest the work of lifting it. 
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